Many allege that the accounting profession has failed to adapt to fundamental changes in the business environment because it has not developed timely guidance for reporting intangible assets. Regulatory attention has also focused on the disclosure companies make with respect to intangible assets. Accounting for the value of intangible assets acquired in a merger transaction is a key component of this issue.
Market Reaction to Proposed Changes in Accounting for

Purchased Research and Development in R&D Intensive Industries Introduction
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), hundreds of articles, studies, and consultants' reports have criticized accounting for its failure to respond to fundamental changes in the economy because financial reporting does not adequately address the issues of accounting for intangible assets [FASB 2001c ]. The FASB specifically includes the issue of accounting for purchased in-process research and development (IPR&D) costs in defining the scope of a proposed project on intangibles [FASB 2001c, 3] .
Expensing of IPR&D is required by FASB Interpretation No. 4 [1975] . Before 1990, however, there were only three cases of such expensing [Deng and Lev 1998 ].
The use of this technique accelerated after the 1995 purchase of Lotus by IBM in which IBM immediately wrote off $1,840 million, 57.5% of the total purchase price, and 24.2% of 1995 operating income. In 1998, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), signaled increased regulatory attention would be paid to charges for IPR&D as part of the SEC initiative to improve the quality of financial reporting [Levitt, 1998 ].
The SEC questioned the appropriateness of past IPR&D charges, scrutinized reported IPR&D chargeoffs by individual companies, and challenged companies to justify their charges. The SEC included IPR&D as a topic in its call for research issued at the American Accounting Association meeting on August 15, 1999 [Securities and Ex-change Commission 1999] , and the largest accounting firms in the United States asked the FASB to review accounting for IPR&D [Schroeder 1999 ].
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) responded to these concerns about the accounting treatment of IPR&D with a plan to require capitalization of IPR&D and subsequent amortization. The FASB's announced intention was to have a new standard in place by the end of 1999 [FASB 1999b ]. However, the complexity of accounting for intangibles acquired in a merger led the FASB to indefinitely delay an exposure draft on the topic [MacDonald 1999a] . The FASB noted a need to carefully deliberate the issue in a long-term project on intangibles [MacDonald 1999a ]. The FASB added intangible assets as an agenda item in October 2001 [Lev 2001 ]. SFAS
141, Business Combinations [FASB 2001a] leaves unchanged the requirement in FASB
Interpretation No. 4 [1975] that IPR&D is expensed at the date of the business combination.
In this paper, we examine market reactions of firms in three industry groups that are R&D intensive (computer software, computer hardware, and biotechnology) to perceived changes in the treatment of IPR&D. The SEC, industry analysts, and firms predict that changes in the policy or the increased scrutiny of the charges taken under existing policy with respect to IPR&D charge-offs can have a significant impact on stock prices [Dugan 1999 ].
The results show that the stock prices of firms in R&D-intensive industries react negatively, on average, to events that either increase the probability of new policy that would reduce disclosure about IPR&D charges or the probability of increased SEC scrutiny of IPR&D charges. The announcement of a FASB proposal to capitalize IPR&D charges, coming after protracted news coverage of SEC deliberations, evokes no significant market reaction. However, the FASB announcement that it would defer the rule produces a positive market reaction that is statistically significant. The results indicate that investors viewed the potential for increased regulation of IPR&D charges as detrimental to the value of R&D intensive firms.
Cross-sectional analysis, using an econometric method that controls for return correlations across firms and for correlations between explanatory variables, uncovers no effects of predicted firm characteristics on stock-price reactions to the initial public disclosure of the potential increase in SEC scrutiny of IPR&D charges. Over subsequent events, stock-price reactions depend on variables that represent firms' likelihood of being affected. In general, more negative stock-price reactions to events increasing the probability of regulation are associated with greater IPR&D charges and with membership in the software industry. Membership in the biotechnology industry reduces the negative impact of one announcement. Larger firms and those firms with experience in acquiring R&D intensive firms are less negatively affected by a call for the financial community to participate in reducing IPR&D charges. These effects suggest that valuations reported by large and experienced firms might have greater credibility or be less affected by new regulation or increased scrutiny of IPR&D charges. In contrast, larger firms are more negatively affected by news that particular corporations are being singled out for review. This result supports the prediction that investors perceive the most negative impact on value for firms that have the greatest visibility with respect to regulators' concerns.
What is IPR&D and Why is it Important?
In-process research and development (IPR&D) is the research and development acquired singly, as a part of a group of assets, or in a business combination accounted for using the purchase method. In an acquisition, the difference between the book value of the net assets of the acquired company and the purchase price is divided into two components: 1) the difference between book value and market value of tangible and identifiable intangible assets (including IPR&D) less the current market value of the liabilities, and 2) the remainder of the purchase price, which is attributed to goodwill.
During the event period for this research, goodwill was capitalized and amortized over a period not to exceed forty years; IPR&D was written off in the period of acquisition.
1
Attention has focused on IPR&D for at least four reasons: 1) The asset base of companies has changed and intangible assets, including research and development, have become increasingly important; 2) The new requirement that all mergers be accounted for using the purchase method means that the difference between purchase price and book value of the assets must be accounted for in all mergers; 3) The size and number of IPR&D chargeoffs had been accelerating since 1990; and 4) The SEC questioned the valuation of IPR&D, focused attention on IPR&D because of the relative size of charges relative to the deal value, and indicated that the financial reports of companies reporting large IPR&D charges might be examined [Schroeder 1999 ].
Previous Research on R&D
1 After the period examined in this paper, the accounting treatment of goodwill changed under SFAS 141 [FASB 2001a] and SFAS 142 [FASB 2001b ] such that goodwill is subject to an annual impairment test rather than amortized over a fixed period. In the period of impairment, goodwill is charged against current earnings. IPR&D is still expensed in full in the period of acquisition.
Internally generated research and development (R&D) is disclosed as a line item on the income statement. Existing research supports the conclusion that internal R&D contributes value to the firm; capital markets ascribe asset-like status to such expenditures [Linsmeier, et al., 1998 ]. Higher than expected R&D expenditures tend to be accompanied by abnormally high stock returns [Woolridge 1998 , Chan et al. 1990 , Bublitz and Ettredge 1989 . Cockburn and Griliches [1988] and Hall [1993] find that the firms' market values incorporate R&D as an intangible asset. Hirschey and Weygandt [1985] infer from firms' market values that the lives of internally generated stocks of R&D range from five to ten years.
Rather than determine asset values as a function of market values, Lev and Sougiannis [1996] estimate the value of R&D from the earnings that were ultimately derived from the R&D. They construct pro forma earnings under a capitalization and amortization accounting policy, and document an association of both stock prices and returns with the difference between reported earnings and pro forma earnings. Again, the finding is consistent with the hypotheses that the capital markets views R&D investments as assets and that those assets have measurable useful lives.
Recognition of IPR&D
When a company with an internal research and development program is acquired in a merger, the value of the IPR&D should be estimated and expensed in the period of the acquisition. Because internal R&D is expensed immediately, FASB Interpretation 4 [1975] requires IPR&D to be expensed at the date of the purchase. To the extent that the markets ascribe asset-like status to IPR&D, similar to findings for inter-nal R&D, questions raised about possible overstatement of IPR&D assets are likely to have a negative effect on the value of companies that are in R&D intensive industries and likely to have IPR&D charges.
Further, to the extent that regulatory scrutiny provides incentives for companies to include in goodwill all of the excess of purchase price over the fair market value of the identifiable net tangible assets acquired, rather than separately disclosing a value for IPR&D, disclosure about IPR&D could be reduced or eliminated. The SEC targeted IPR&D charges that seemed large relative to the deal value and raised issues about the measurement techniques used to value IPR&D. To avoid scrutiny, it would appear that companies have only to eliminate the IPR&D charge and incorporate this value into goodwill. Intangible assets included in goodwill have varied lives and different expected future benefits, so the goodwill asset is more difficult to interpret than any single component that might be disclosed. To the extent that the market ascribes asset-like treatment to IPR&D with a definable useful life, decreased disclosure about this item would reduce the information available to investors about the future benefits expected from the research program.
IPR&D is often recognized as a major portion of the value of an acquisition. For example, in the acquisition of Ares Software by Adobe Systems in 1996, nearly all (95%) of the purchase price was written off as IPR&D. Since 1995, the number and size of charges significantly increased. Insert Table 2 about Here
The SEC Position and Reaction by the FASB and Corporate America
In 1995, after IBM recorded a $1.8 billion IPR&D write-off, John Glynn, accountant with the SEC, stated in a speech that marked the beginning of the SEC's focus on IPR&D write-offs: "When reviewing purchase price allocations that include significant charges for purchased R&D, the (SEC) staff is likely to raise such issues as the following in consideration of IPR&D:
• Purchased R&D must be valued separately based on appropriate assumptions and valuation techniques.
• The staff believes that other identifiable intangible assets and goodwill exist in many business combinations involving significant amounts of acquired technology, and can be expected to challenge purchase price allocations in which substantially all of the purchase price is allocated to purchased R&D."
The SEC has challenged the costs allocated to IPR&D, questioning both valuation methods and the value assigned to core technologies and IPR&D. The Commission has stated that the increasing size of IPR&D charges has raised a "red flag".
The SEC contends that it is increasing focus on the rules for expensing IPR&D because of apparent abuses in valuation. Robert Bayless, Chief Accountant with the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance stated, "What we're seeing is that a rule that has been in place since 1975 has been practiced for the last five years in an apparently more aggressive manner … If that rule is being abused, then individual firms are tilting the playing field" [Herhold 1999 ]. SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner noted, "As the number of companies claiming larger (IPR&D) write-offs increased in early 1998, we began to dig deeper into the company's appraisal assumptions" [Schroeder 1999 ].
The SEC concern was reiterated by Chairman Arthur Levitt in a speech entitled "The Numbers Game" at the NYU Center of Law and Business; Levitt referred to current IPR&D accounting practices as "merger magic" [Levitt 1998 ]. In January 1999, the SEC sent a letter to 150 companies indicating that their filings for fiscal year 1998 may be subject to review because of the relative size of various charges including IPR&D.
potentially to restatement of financials if a registrant's valuation of IPR&D is materially misleading. SEC scrutiny caused some high technology firms to claim they had been unfairly targeted by a change in rules rather than enforcement of rules [MacDonald 1999b ]. Mark Nebergall, a vice president for finance and tax policy of the 1,500-firm Software and Information Industry Association, was quoted as declaring the existence of "a resounding consensus that the SEC has been unfair" [Schroeder 1999 ]. FASB chairman Ed Jenkins stated that, in response to assertions that amortizing IPR&D should not matter if it does not affect the cash flow of the merged company, "corporate executives tell him that they fear investors will not understand and will send a stock 
Potential Effects of Changes in IPR&D Accounting
Expensing of IPR&D is required by FASB Interpretation No. 4 [FASB 1975 ].
The value of IPR&D is to be established at the time of purchase and immediately written off against earnings. However, the SEC is concerned that overvaluing IPR&D results in undervaluing goodwill. If the write-off were overstated and goodwill understated, the decrease in amortization expense (prior to FAS 142 [FASB 2001b ]) would cause future earnings to be overstated. After FAS 142, a reduction in the valuation of goodwill would limit the possibility of subsequent impairment charges being recognized.
Criticism of reported IPR&D values, scrutiny of accounting practices and investigations of particular companies by regulators is likely to convey a negative signal to the market about the reliability of accounting numbers reported by the sample firms.
Because IPR&D valuations should be related to future cash flows as the R&D efforts lead to new products, concerns about the validity of these reported numbers may lead to a decrease in stock prices. Similarly, to the extent that the IPR&D asset is combined with goodwill, rather than being reported separately, estimates of the asset value and related cash flows for IPR&D are more difficult, which could also lead to a potentially lower stock price. A secondary effect of such a decline in stock prices would be that mergers in which company stock is the consideration would become more difficult, further reducing their growth opportunities, and potentially leading to a larger decrease in the value of the company. 
Events and Predicted Market Reactions
A series of events between August 1998 and July 1999 defined the SEC's policy on IPR&D and the FASB's deliberation of the issue. The SEC was concerned primarily with the elimination of any abuses of the IPR&D chargeoff. 7 In response to the issues raised by the SEC, the FASB, expressed the intention of changing GAAP to require capitalization and amortization of IPR&D. The board later reversed its position. 5 In an earlier draft, Dowdell and Press report that despite the income-increasing nature of the restatements, IPR&D charges generate a significant negative stock market reaction (on average -3.5%) to the announcement of the restatement. 6 The SEC normally defers to the FASB or the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) for issues of accounting policy and establishment of GAAP, while the SEC concentrates on enforcement of GAAP. In the instance of IPR&D, however, the purpose of the SEC seems to have been to influence policy. The attention that the SEC focused on IPR&D in letters and speeches did not lead to any significant enforcement actions. In 2003, the SEC published a report in 2003 [SEC 2003 ] detailing all of the enforcement actions filed by the SEC between July 31, 1997 and July 30. 2002. Of the 515 actions filed, only eight were related to improper asset valuation in a business combination. The report did not identify any of these actions as related to the valuation of goodwill or IPR&D. 7 The SEC normally defers to the FASB or the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) for issues of accounting policy and establishment of GAAP, while the SEC concentrates on enforcement of GAAP. In the instance of IPR&D, however, the purpose of the SEC seems to have been to influence policy. The attention that the SEC focused on IPR&D in letters and speeches did not lead to any significant enforcement actions. In 2003, the SEC published a report in 2003 [SEC 2003 ] detailing all of the enforcement actions filed by the SEC between July 31, 1997 and July 30. 2002. Of the 515 actions filed, only eight were related to improper asset valuation in a business combination. The report did not identify any of the actions as related to the valuation of goodwill or IPR&D.
We examine the market reaction to eight events during the period. Table 3 summarizes the events.
Insert Table 3 about Here
Data and Methods
Sample Construction
The initial sample was created by identifying high technology standard industrial classification (SIC) codes that we expect to have high research and development expenditures. Information technology and biotechnology, particularly pharmaceuticals, are the industries cited in the business press as those most likely to take IPR&D charges [MacDonald 1999c ]. Further, a Practice Aid [2001] was published by the AICPA provides guidance on financial reporting of assets acquired to be used in R&D activities, including IPR&D projects. While this practice aid applies to all industries, the AICPA focuses on the software, electronic devices, and pharmaceutical industries because these constituents raised significant concerns about the application of GAAP and the materiality of the IPR&D charges in these industries.
The industries examined in this study are listed in Table 4 . Three industry groups are defined: computer software (7370 and 7372); computer hardware (3570-3572, 3576-3577, 3661, 3663, 3674, 3677, and 3695); and biotechnology (pharmaceutical & medical; 2833-2836, 3841, and 3845) . The table reports the mean and median R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales) for each of the SIC codes.
The industry median R&D intensity ranges from five to 172 percent in 1998.
Insert Table 4 about Here
The initial sample is 1,824 firms that appear in both the Compustat and CRSP databases. We eliminated firms from the initial sample for either of two reasons. First, those that did not have a price on the CRSP database on January 2, 1998 were removed (268 firms). Second, firms that did not have at least 300 daily returns in 1998-1999
were eliminated (73 firms). The final sample consists of 1,483 firms.
Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics appear in Table 5 . The firm characteristics indicate a skewed distribution, with medians substantially smaller than means on all characteristics. The mean R&D intensity is 249% (median 13%); the mean of total assets is $1.6 billion (median $65 million) and mean market capitalization is $3.1 billion (median $108 million). Firms in the sample report median sales of $56 million but report a net loss of approximately $0.2 million in 1998. The expensing of research and development expenditures as incurred probably contributes to the low reported income.
Insert Table 5 about Here
Methods
We test the average stock-price reaction to each of the events using the multivariate regression model (MVRM) suggested by Schipper and Thompson [1983] . The are identical for all the firms in this study, we can estimate the MVRM by forming the stocks into a portfolio and estimating a single regression equation on the portfolio re-turns [Thompson 1985 ]. To increase the efficiency of the parameter estimates, we use portfolio weights based on the estimated full covariance matrix of residuals, S. The residuals used to compute S come from a set of first-pass OLS regressions for each stock.
The vector of portfolio weights is P (1 S 1) S 1
We estimate the following regression:
where pt R = return on portfolio p on day t; mt R = return on the CRSP value-weighted NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq index on day t; D kt = dummy variable, equal to 1 during event period k and 0 otherwise; pt ε = random disturbance which is assumed to be normal and independent of the return on the market and the event period dummy variables.
To test the effects of firm characteristics on the stock-price reaction to the events, we use a modified version of the portfolio weighting procedure suggested by Sefcik and Thompson [1986] . In the Sefcik-Thompson procedure, a different set of portfolio weights corresponding to each characteristic is used to re-estimate equation
(1). The estimates of the pk γ then reflect the effect of the pth characteristic on the stockprice reaction to the kth event.
Unlike the MVRM method we use for the first set of regressions in the paper, the Sefcik-Thompson procedure does not account for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation of the residuals. Chandra and Balachandran [1992] propose an extension of the Sefcik-Thompson procedure that they call the Portfolio Constant Correlation Model (PCCM). Chandra and Balachandran report that the PCCM test is well specified and more powerful than the Sefcik-Thompson test. To date, we are aware of no other published accounting research that uses this model. 8 The cross-sectional tests of stockprice reactions in this paper incorporate the PCCM procedure.
To calculate the portfolio weights for the PCCM tests of firm characteristics, let
where p X is an N×1 vector of the pth firm characteristic (N is the number of stocks in the portfolio). The set of portfolio weights corresponding to the pth characteristic is the pth row of the P×N matrix
where σ is a diagonal matrix, the nonzero elements of which are the residual standard deviations of the N stocks, and C is the constant correlation matrix of the raw returns of the stocks. The diagonal elements of C are equal to 1. The off-diagonal elements vary by industry or industry pair, but are all equal to the same estimated average pairwise correlation between any two stocks in the same industry or industry pair. (See Chandra and Balachandran [1992] and Aneja, Chandra and Gunay [1989] for details.)
Results
To document stock-price reactions, table 6 reports portfolio cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), based on the multivariate regression model in equation (1), for the three-day period (t=-1, 0 and +1 relative to the Wall Street Journal report) around each of the eight events.
Insert Table 6 about Here Four of the eight events appear to reveal new information that affects the stock prices of firms in research and development intensive industries. Events 1, 4 and 5 produce negative stock-price reactions that are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Each of these events is an action that increases the probability, or expected severity, of SEC action against firms writing off acquired IPR&D expenses. The reaction to Event 1, the initial report that the SEC would consider limits on purchased IPR&D writeoffs, is highly economically significant at -2.68%. Events 4 and 5, in early February 1999, are an announcement of actions against specific firms, and a pair of speeches by SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner mentioning IPR&D write-offs, respectively.
Both of these events evoke negative stock-price reactions of about three-fourths of one percent. Event 8, the FASB decision to defer a proposed rule abolishing IPR&D writeoffs, produces a positive stock-price reaction of 1.57%, which is significant at the 0.1% level. The results support the idea that investors perceived limitations on IPR&D writeoffs as detrimental to the present value of R&D intensive firms' future cash flows. Table 7 reports cross-sectional tests using the PCCM approach of Chandra and Balachandran [1992] . Each column of Table 6 presents the results for one event, similar to a regression of the stock-price reaction to that event on the various explanatory vari-ables. The actual structure of the tests, however, entails the portfolio of sample firms being differently weighted for each explanatory variable. The weights are constructed, taking into account correlations among firms's returns and correlations among explanatory variables, to make the portfolio uniquely represent the explanatory variable of interest. A time-series regression is then conducted of the portfolio return on the eight dummy variables. The sign and significance of the coefficients are analogous to those in the cross-sectional regression commonly reported in conjunction with an event study.
The events for which statistically significant coefficients appear in table 7 do not directly match up to those manifesting significance in table 6. For example, event 1, which produces a significant negative average stock-price reaction overall, does not receive a significant coefficient for any explanatory variable portfolio. The results for event 1 suggest that investors, while concluding that possible SEC restrictions were bad news for stocks in the sample as a whole, did not distinguish the effect by firm size, R&D expenses, recent acquisitions, or industry membership.
Insert Table 7 about Here Event 2, which is insignificant in table 6, is significant for three explanatory variable portfolios in table 7, suggesting that the "Numbers Game" speech contributed to investors sorting out the different effects of the potential SEC action. The event 2 stock-price reaction is a positive function of firm size and a dummy variable for recent acquisition of a firm reporting R&D expense, and a negative function of software industry membership. The results for size and acquisition activity are surprising given SEC Chairman Levitt's specific mention of large IPR&D writeoffs. However, Levitt also emphasized the need for the financial community, rather than the government, to take the lead in solving IRP&D and other accounting problems. Investors may have concluded that large firms and those most active in acquisitions would be able persuade analysts, the SEC, and the FASB to accept those firms' existing practices. The negative relation to software industry membership supports the idea that it would be more difficult in practice to justify classifying acquired firms' software development activities as R&D. This is consistent with Levitt's implication that some acquiring firms classify too much of the purchase price as R&D. Table 7 also reports that event 4 (with a significantly negative coefficient in Table 6) is a negative function of firm size and R&D, and a positive function of biotechnology industry membership. These article indicates that the SEC "crackdown" may be causing companies to "second guess" their accounting methods, and indicate that some executives were hesitant to air complaints because they were concerned about the potential their company would be targeted. These articles seem to indicate that companies may be willing to change their accounting simply to avoid scrutiny regardless of the underlying rationale for the charge-off. These articles also refer to the 150 letters sent to some registrants. Lacking either a comprehensive list of firms that already received the letter or details about how future letters would be directed, investors probably judged that the most negative impact would fall on firms with the greatest political risk [Watts and Zimmerman 1986] . Political risk is equivalent to visibility with respect to the issue on which regulators are focusing at a given time. Larger firms tend to be more visible with respect to any issue, and firms with greater R&D expenses would draw attention in this situation. Media reports focused on information technology firms, implying that biotechnology firms were less affected, consistent with the positive coefficient for biotechnology industry membership. Event 6, the FASB proposal to eliminate IPR&D write-offs, is associated with a marginally significant positive coefficient for R&D intensity. While this is opposite the expected direction, the lack of overall significance for this event in Table 6 and the marginal significance of the coefficient in Table 6 suggest that the result is not meaningful.
The final statistically significant result in Table 7 is that the stock-price reaction to Event 8, the deferral of the FASB proposal, is negatively associated with computer hardware industry membership. No industry-specific news reports around this date suggest a reason for the peculiar association. In Table 7 , the sample is segregated into the three industries represented: biotechnology, computer hardware, and computer software. None of the industries shows any individual reaction that qualitatively differs from that discussed above for four of the dates. For the two dates which do indicate significant returns in the predicted direction, the biotechnology and computer hardware industries show results consistent with that reported for the total sample. In contrast, the software industry shows no reaction to these two events. Since many of the restatements made in recent months have been by software companies, a finding of no reaction would indicate that the market believes that, in general, previously announced numbers were not misleading.
Conclusions
The debate over IPR&D accounting is likely to persist over the next several years because of its importance in evaluating the quality of earnings and estimating fu-ture cash flows. This issue arises not only as part of the discussion of merger accounting, but also in the more general consideration of how to value intangible assets in a relevant and reliable manner. The evidence in this study indicates that the stock prices of firms in R&D intensive industries react to changes in accounting for IPR&D, but the reactions vary by industry. The finding of a different reaction for the software industry raises the issue of how different product types affect the valuation of a firm, in particular how producers of intangible products are valued. The findings also raise the question of how IPR&D is incorporated into investor and analyst valuation models across different industry groups. As the importance of intangible assets and outputs continues to increase, accounting researchers will need to become increasingly concerned with developing and testing models which assist in providing values for intangible assets such as research and development and knowledge capital. The reversals were for mergers in both 1998, the current year, and 1997, the previous year. This event was noteworthy not only because of the reversed charge, but also because this was the first indication that the SEC might encourage/require retroactive restatement of financial statements for companies that took large charge-offs. As such, this reversal was widely reported by the press -4 Feb. 1, 1999 Two WSJ articles on proposed IPR&D changes: "Firms say SEC earnings scrutiny goes too far" [MacDonald 1999b ] and "High technology firms are upset over SEC crackdown on write-offs" [Schroeder 1999] The first article details industry reaction to the proposed IPR&D changes. Also in this article is a discussion of industry reaction to the letter sent by the SEC in January 1999 to 150 firms expected to be preparing their Annual Reports on Form 10-K. The companies receiving the letter were selected based on news reports of significant charges they had taken in 1998. The second major article also explained the industry reaction to the proposed changes. In the first speech, Turner made reference to the letter sent by the SEC in January and noted that a copy of the letter was available at the SEC web site entitled "Initiatives for Improving the Quality of Financial Reporting." The second speech was specific to the scrutiny of IPR&D and was entitled, "Making Financial Statements Real: Recent Problems in the Accounting for Purchased IPR&D." There is indication in both of these speeches that the FASB would be considering the appropriateness of current account requirements on this issue. The Board announced that all purchased in-process research and development should be recognized as an asset and amortized over its useful life and stated that the FASB expected to issue an exposure draft of this proposed change before the end of summer 1999. The proposal would preclude any expensing of IPR&D, regardless of the valuation models used. Additionally, the Board determined that IPR&D would be addressed as a separate component from the business combinations project, and expressed their intention of issuing a separate standard specifically dealing with accounting for IPR&D.
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April 30, 1999 WSJ article "SEC official reports R&D write-offs fell by half due to rules" [SEC official 1999] This article reported on a speech by Brian Lane, director or the SEC's division of corporate finance. Mr. Lane stated that companies had reduced previously reported IPR&D charges by about $5 billion, which was about half of the $10 billion that had come under SEC scrutiny. Mr. Lane indicated that the IPR&D charges of more than 50 companies had come under SEC scrutiny, and that this represented the "first wave" of SEC review of charges that appeared to be large. Portfolio abnormal return, expressed as a decimal and not a percentage, and t-statistics, for 1,483 traded firms in the computer hardware, computer software, communications, biotechnology, and transportation industries around each of eight events. Abnormal returns are three times the coefficients, in a regression of portfolio returns (returns of sample firms weighted on the basis of the full estimated covariance matrix of residuals) on a market index and dummy variables corresponding to the eight events. Each dummy variable is equal to one during the three-day event period (t=-1, 0 and +1 relative to each news report) and zero otherwise. TABLE 7 Cross-sectional tests of relation between stock price reaction, to eight events relating to rules on accounting for acquired inprocess research and development expense, and explanatory variables.
For each event, the table reports the three-day abnormal return, expressed as a decimal and not a percent, of a portfolio constructed to be uniquely sensitive to the variable shown. The portfolio formation procedure comes from Balachandran and Chandra 1992. Abnormal returns are three times the coefficients, in a regression of portfolio returns on a market index and dummy variables corresponding to the eight events. Each dummy variable is equal to one during the three-day event period (t=-1, 0 and +1 relative to each news report) and zero otherwise. 
